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I. INTRODUCTION
Despite the increasing body of appellate decisions on the equi-
table distribution of marital assets, no appellate decisions in North
Carolina have addressed the issue of the classification of a gradu-
ate or professional degree earned during the marriage as marital
property and its consequent valuation and distribution as a divisi-
ble marital asset.
The ratification of the legislation commonly known as "An Act
for the Equitable Distribution of Marital Property,"1 made effec-
tive October 1, 1981, to all cases subsequently filed seeking an ab-
solute divorce,2 caused sweeping reform in the North Carolina di-
vorce laws, which theretofore essentially judicially disregarded any
consideration of distribution or allocation of real or personal prop-
erty acquired during the marriage by either or both spouses.' Ali-
mony was believed to be the great leveler in adjusting the divorc-
ing spouses' relative financial positions, but it failed significantly to
achieve parity. The unfair results of the prior laws affecting mari-
tal dissolutions were amply demonstrated in the case of
Leatherman v. Leatherman,4 in which the court found that the
wife had no interest in her husband's corporation, formed during
their thirty-year marriage, to which she had made significant non-
monetary contributions.3
The Act for Equitable Distribution of Marital Property was
intended to be a remedial statute6 premised upon the recognition
that marriage is "a partnership, a shared enterprise to which both
spouses make valuable contributions, albeit in different ways."'7 It
is in this context that the North Carolina trial and appellate courts
1. Distribution by Court of Marital Property Upon Divorce, N. C. GEN. STAT.
§ 50-20 (1983).
2. Id.
3. Leatherman v. Leatherman, 297 N.C. 618, 256 S.E.2d 793 (1979).
4. Id. at 627, 256 S.E.2d at 798.
5. Id.
6. Wade v. Wade, 72 N.C. App. 372, 325 S.E.2d 260 (1985).
7. Loeb v. Loeb, 72 N.C. App. 205, 324 S.E.2d 33 (1985) (quoting Sharp, Eq-
uitable Distribution of Property in North Carolina: A Preliminary Analysis, .61
N.C.L. REV. 247, 249 [1983]).
[Vol. 10:69
2
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 1 [1987], Art. 2
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol10/iss1/2
EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF DEGREES
will wrestle with the dilemma commonly referred to as the "uni-
versity degree-divorce decree"' or the "student-spouse-working
spouse" syndrome."
As of this writing, thirty-one states have rendered decisions as
to whether a graduate or professional degree should be considered
marital property. 10 Only three states have judicially declared that
graduate or professional degrees are distributable property.1' In a
controversial and cogent opinion, the New York Court of Appeals
(New York's highest appellate court) ruled that a physician's in-
creased earning capacity resulting from a professional license to
practice medicine obtained during the marriage is divisible prop-
erty at divorce. 12 In Michigan, one panel of a divided court of ap-
peals ruled that the wife was entitled to a percentage share of the
present value of earnings attributable to her husband's law de-
gree. 13 In Massachusetts, a wife who supported her husband
through graduate orthodontic training was deemed entitled to
share in the value of her husband's license.' 4 In an analogous deci-
sion, the Iowa Supreme Court ruled that, although the husband's
law degree and license were not marital assets, the "potential for
increase in future earning capacity made possible by the law de-
8. Haugan v. Haugan, 117 Wis. 2d 200, 343 N.W.2d 796, 799 (1984).
9. Note, Family Law: Professional Degrees in 1986-Family Sacrifice Equals
Family Asset, 25 WASHBURN L.J. 276 (1986).
10. Arizona, Alabama, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Dela-
ware, Florida, Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michi-
gan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas,
Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
11. Massachusetts: Reen v. Reen, 8 Fain. L. Rep. (BNA) 2193 (Feb. 9, 1982);
New York: O'Brien v. O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d 576, 498 N.Y.S.2d 743, 489 N.E.2d 712
(1985); Michigan: Woodworth v. Woodworth, 126 Mich. App. 258, 337 N.W.2d 332
(1983), Thomas v. Thomas, 131 Mich. App. 830, 346 N.W.2d 595 (1984). Contra
Olah v. Olah, 135 Mich. App. 404, 354 N.W.2d 359 (1984). In Lira v. Lira, 68 Ohio
App. 2d 164, 428 N.E.2d 445 (1980), the court of appeals said a medical degree is
an asset, but a medical license was not subject to precise division; nor was the
degree itself, it was only a factor to consider. This decision utilizing the limited
property concepts of Graham, see infra text accompanying note 49, to rationalize
to the conclusion that the license is not property is a prime example of judicial
confusion as to disposition of professional degrees.
12. O'Brien v. O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d at 588, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 749, 489 N.E.2d at
717.
13. Woodworth v. Woodworth, 126 Mich. App. at 269, 337 N.W.2d at 337.
14. Reen v. Reen, 8 Fam. L. Rep. at 2193.
19871
3
Gailor and McGill: The Equitable Distribution of Professional Degrees upon Divorce i
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1987
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
gree and certificate of admission '"15 constituted an asset susceptible
to distribution.
Appellate courts reject the concept of a graduate or profes-
sional degree as property, reasoning that an academic degree does
not fall within the scope of traditional definitions of property,
which include characteristics of an exchange value and nontrans-
ferability. 16 Other courts have found that the valuation of a degree,
or the determination of the present value of the enhanced earning
capacity arising therefrom, is either too speculative" or a mere ex-
pectancy interest.1 8 Nevertheless, the majority of courts that reject
the concept determine that equitable principles require that the
working spouse be compensated in some manner for her or his con-
tributions to the acquisition of the advanced degree earned by the
student spouse during the course of the marriage. The courts have
utilized multiple theories for compensation, including restitution
based on unjust enrichment of the student spouse, 9 reimburse-
ment,2" periodic, lump sum, or distributive alimony awards,2" and
15. In re Marriage of Horstman, 263 N.W.2d 885 (Iowa 1978).
16. See, e.g., Jones v. Jones, 454 So. 2d 1006 (Ala. Civ. App. 1984); Pyeatte v.
Pyeatte, 135 Ariz. 346, 661 P.2d 196 (1982); In re Marriage of Graham, 194 Colo.
429, 574 P.2d 75 (1978); In re Marriage of Weinstein, 128 Ill. App. 3d 234, 470
N.E.2d 551 (1984); Inman v. Inman, 648 S.W.2d 847 (Ky. 1982); Archer v. Archer,
303 Md. 347, 493 A.2d 1074 (1985); Scott v. Scott, 645 S.W.2d 193 (Mo. Ct. App.
1982); Ruben v. Ruben, 123 N.H. 358, 461 A.2d 733 (1983); Lynn v. Lynn, 91 N.J.
510, 453 A.2d 539 (1982); Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 N.J. 488, 453 A.2d 527 (1982);
Stevens v. Stevens, 23 Ohio St. 3d 115, 492 N.E.2d 131 (1986); Pacht v. Judd, 13
Ohio App. 3d 363, 469 N.E.2d 918 (1983); Hodge v. Hodge, 337 Pa. Super. 151,
486 A.2d 951 (1985); Helm v. Helm, 289 S.C. 169, 345 S.E.2d 720 (1986); Frausto
v. Frausto, 611 S.W.2d 656 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981); Grosskopf v. Grosskopf, 677
P.2d 814 (Wyo. 1984). Three jurisdictions have refused to declare enhanced earn-
ing capacity or future earnings resulting from acquisition of a degree during mar-
riage as property. Indiana: McManama v. McManama, 272 Ind. 483, 399 N.E.2d
371 (1980); Arkansas: Meinholz v. Meinholz, 283 Ark. 509, 678 S.W.2d 348 (1984);
Florida: Hughes v. Hughes, 438 So. 2d 146 (Fla. 1983).
17. Lynn, 91 N.J. 510, 453 A.2d 539; Mahoney, 91 N.J. 488, 453 A.2d 527;
Archer, 303 Md. 347, 493 A.2d 1074; Ruben, 123 N.H. 358, 461 A.2d 527; Saint-
Pierre v. Saint-Pierre, 357 N.W.2d 250 (S.D. 1984); DeWitt v. DeWitt, 98 Wis. 2d
44, 296 N.W.2d 761 (1980).
18. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Weinstein, 128 Ill. App. 3d 234; Pacht, 13
Ohio App. 3d 363, 469 N.E.2d 918.
19. See, e.g., Pyeatte, 135 Ariz. 346, 661 P.2d 196; DeLa Rosa v. DeLa Rosa,
309 N.W.2d 755 (Minn. 1981); Hubbard v. Hubbard, 603 P.2d 747 (Okla. 1979);
cf. Haugan v. Haugan, 117 Wis. 2d 200, 343 N.W.2d 796 (1984).
20. Moss v. Moss, 639 S.W.2d 370 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982); Washburn v. Wash-
burn, 101 Wash. 2d 168, 677 P.2d 152 (1984); Lowrey v. Lowrey, 633 S.W.2d 157
[Vol. 10:69
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unequal property divisions.22
This article will examine the concept of the advanced degree
as property subject to equitable distribution in the context of the
North Carolina equitable distribution of marital property statute
and the prevalent theories of compensation to the working spouse
within the scope of North Carolina's statutory property distribu-
tion and spousal maintenance schemes.
II. NORTH CAROLINA DOES NOT PER SE EXCLUDE GRADUATE AND
PROFESSIONAL DEGREES FROM CONSIDERATION AS PROPERTY
SUBJECT TO EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION
North Carolina's equitable distribution statute sets out lan-
guage providing for specific and expansive inclusions of property in
the distributable marital estate23 and for specific exclusions by de-
fining separate property.24 The statute does not specifically include
(Mo. Ct. App. 1982); Sullivan v. Sullivan, 37 Cal. 3d 762, 691 P.2d 1020 (1984);
Lehmicke v. Lehmicke, 339 Pa. Super. 559, 489 A.2d 782 (1985). See also Frausto,
611 S.W.2d 656; and Haugan, 117 Wis. 2d 200, 343 N.W.2d 796.
21. Mahoney, 91 N.J. 488; Lynn, 91 N.J. 510; In re Marriage of McVey, 641
P.2d 300 (Colo. 1981); Reiss v. Reiss, 200 N.J. Super. 122, 490 A.2d 378 (1984);
Archer, 303 Md. 347; Saint Pierre, 357 N.W.2d 250; Greer v. Greer, 32 Colo. App.
196, 510 P.2d 905 (1973); Adair v. Adair 670 P.2d 1002 (Okla. Ct. App. 1983);
Zahler v. Zahler, 8 Fain. L. Rep. 2696 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1982); McManama, 272
Ind. 483, 399 N.E.2d 371; Hughes, 438 So. 2d 146; Washburn v. Washburn, 101
Wash. 2d 168, 677 P.2d 152 (1984); In re Marriage of Lundberg, 107 Wis. 2d 1,
318 N.W.2d 918 (1982); Stevens, 23 Ohio St. 3d 115, 492 N.E.2d 131.
22. Geer v. Geer, 84 N.C. App. 471, 353 S.E.2d 427 (1987); Wilcox v. Wilcox,
173 Ind. App. 661, 365 N.E.2d 792 (1977); Jones, 454 So. 2d 1006; Grosskopf, 677
P.2d 814; Scott, 645 S.W.2d 193. See also IND. CODE ANN. § 31-1-11.511(c) (Burns
1987).
23. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(b)(1)(1983) provides:
For purposes of this section:
'Marital Property' means all real and personal property acquired by ei-
tfier spouse or both spouses during the course of the marriage and before
the date of separation of the parties and presently owned, except prop-
erty determined to be separate property in accordance with subdivision
(2) of this section. Marital property includes all vested pension and re-
tirement rights, including military pensions eligible under the federal
Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act.
24. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(b)(2)(1983) provides:
'Separate Property' means all real and personal property acquired by a
spouse before marriage or acquired by a spouse by bequest, devise, de-
scent, or gift during the course of the marriage. However, property ac-
quired by gift from the other spouse during the course of the marriage
shall be considered separate property only if such an intention is stated
19871
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graduate or professional degrees from the marital estate. It pro-
vides only that, "All professional licenses and business licenses
which would terminate on transfer shall be considered separate
property. '2 5 The authority to license, in general, is understood to
be a statutory creation whereby a state or municipality is empow-
ered to tax and regulate particular professions or occupations.26
North Carolina statutes specifically provide for the licensing and
regulation of certain professional occupations as a prerequisite to
the practice of those professions, which include physicians,2 7 certi-
fied public accountants," architects,29 and attorneys at law.3 1 Most
courts either use the terms "degree" and "license" interchangeably
or find that the terms are so inextricably connected as to make the
distinction immaterial.3 1 However, one court distinguished a li-
cense and professional degree as follows:
The two are not the same. A degree is a marital investment, one
which is subject to cost basis analysis. A license, however, is an
illusory asset, one which represents merely a potential for in-
creased earnings. The license is no more and no less than the au-
thorized right to engage in the profession selected. To say the li-
cense has no value obviously would be wrong, but it is just as
obvious that such value is intrinsic and intangible, and not equat-
able with dollar amounts as are things of extrinsic and tangible
in the conveyance. Property acquired in exchange for separate property
shall remain separate property regardless of whether the title is in the
name of the husband or the wife or both, and shall not be considered to
be marital property unless a contrary intention is expressly stated in the
conveyance. The increase in value of separate property and the income
derived shall be considered separate property. All professional licenses
and business licenses which would terminate on transfer shall be consid-
ered separate property. The expectation of nonvested pension or retire-
ment or other deferred compensation rights shall be considered separate
property.
25. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(b)(2)(1983).
26. See generally 53 C.J.S. Licenses § 10 (1948).
27. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90 (1985).
28. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 93 (1985).
29. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 83 (1985).
30. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 84 (1985).
31. O'Brien v. O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d 576, 498 N.Y.S.2d 743, 489 N.W.2d 712,
quoted in Woodworth v. Woodworth, 126 Mich. App. 258, 337 N.W.2d 332, 336;
In re Marriage of Horstman, 263 N.W.2d 885, 891 (Iowa 1978); Archer v. Archer,
303 Md. 347, 358, 493 A.2d 1074, 1079; Lynn v. Lynn, 91 N.J. 510, 517, 453 A.2d
539, 542 (1982); Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 N.J. at 488, 496, 453 A.2d 527, 531.
[Vol. 10:69
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value. 2
In making an effort to distinguish a license from a professional
degree, that case acknowledged the different nature of each asset,
an issue that usually is ignored wholly by jurisdictions both recog-
nizing that the advanced degree is property and rejecting the con-
cept.3 However, North Carolina's equitable distribution statute in-
trinsically defines licenses as property, albeit separate property. 4
The principles of statutory construction require that statutory lan-
guage be given its plain and commonly understood meaning35 to
effect the legislative intent. Clearly, the North Carolina legislature
was prepared to embrace in the Equitable Distribution of Property
Act a definition of property substantially broader than that recog-
nized in a majority of states.
III. THE EVOLVING CONCEPTUAL BASIS OF PROPERTY
In the fifty-three jurisdictions that have enacted statutory
schemes for the division and distribution of marital assets upon
divorce, 36 recognizing legal and equitable principles of commonal-
ity of ownership, trial and appellate courts first classify an asset as
either marital (or community property) or separate property." Un-
fortunately, few states have addressed the issue premised in their
distributive statutes (e.g., what qualifies as "property"?), and the
answer has evolved on a case by case basis with little uniformity of
result.3 8
Traditional concepts of property evolved from Blackstonian
theory, which recognized as property only those things that had a
physical existence and over which absolute dominion and control
could be exerted.3 9 Alienability of property was considered an at-
32. Moss v. Moss, 639 S.W.2d 370, 374 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982). Cf. Muckelroy v.
Muckelroy, 84 N.M. 14, 498 P.2d 1357 (1972) where the Supreme Court of New
Mexico held that, while a license was a valuable property right, because it did not
have the attribute of joint ownership it could not be considered community
property.
33. See supra notes 31 and 32.
34. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(b)(2) (Cum. Supp. 1986).
35. Alexander v. Alexander, 68 N.C. App. 548, 550, 315 S.E.2d 772, 775
(1984).
36. 1985 Survey of Family Law, 11 FAM. L. REV. 3015, 3021 (1985).
37. Note, Equitable Distribution of Degrees and Licenses: Two Theories To-
ward Compensating Spousal Contributions, 49 BROOKLYN L. REv. 301, 303 (1983).
38. Id.
39. 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 2 (1897).
19871
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tribute of dominion and control and became inextricably linked
with the definition of property by traditionally oriented commen-
tators and courts.40 As agrarian societies gave way to the progress
of the Industrial Revolution, courts began to recognize more incor-
poreal and intangible interests such as goodwill, trade secrets, and
mineral rights41 as falling within the definition of property and de-
serving the protection of the property laws. The physicalist princi-
ples of the Blackstonian concept of property allowed no protection
for such interests and diminished the utility of the traditional
property laws. 42 The more modern and progressive view of prop-
erty is synthesized in the Restatement of Property,3 which views
property as a collection of legal relations between owners and non-
owners. 44 Owners of property are determined to have certain
rights, privileges, powers, and immunities accorded them by virtue
of ownership. 45 Correlatively, non-owners have a set of duties, lia-
bilities, or disabililties, but no rights relative to owners.48
The majority of states that have considered the issue of
whether a professional degree or license should be recognized as
marital or community property subject to distribution have relied
on traditional property concepts to circumvent including the de-
gree or license in the marital estate. 7 The rationale was best stated
(and exhaustively cited thereafter) 48 by Justice Lee of the Colorado
Supreme Court in In re the Marriage of Graham.49 The rationale
was articulated as follows:
An educational degree, such as an M.B.A. is simply not encom-
passed even by the broad views of the concept of 'property.' It
does not have an exchange value or any objective transferable
40. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 139 (1897); In re Marriage of Graham,
149 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 75.
41. Note, supra note 37, at 310.
42. Id. at 310-11.
43. I RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY, Vol. 1, §§ 1-4 (1936).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. In re Marriage of Weinstein, 128 Ill. App. 3d at 239, 470 N.E.2d at 556.
48. See, e.g., In re McVey, 641 P.2d 300 (Colo. 1981); Ruben, 123 N.H. 358,
461 A.2d 733; Mahoney, 91 N.J. 488, 453 A.2d 527; Archer, 303 Md. 347, 493 A.2d
1074; Olah v. Olah, 135 Mich. App. 404, 354 N.W.2d 359 (1984); Hodge, 337 Pa.
Super. 151, 486 A.2d 951 (1985); Saint-Pierre, 357 N.W.2d 250; In re Washburn,
101 Wash. 2d 168, 677 P.2d 152; In re Lundberg, 107 Wis. 2d 1, 318 N.W.2d 918
(1982).
49. 194 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 75 (1978).
[Vol. 10:69
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value on an open market. It is personal to the holder. It termi-
nates on the death of the holder and is not inheritable. It cannot
be assigned, sold, transferred, conveyed or pledged. An advanced
degree is the cumulative product of many years of previous edu-
cation, combined with diligence and hard work. It may not be ac-
quired by mere expenditure of money. It is simply an intellectual
achievement that may potentially assist in the future acquisition
of property. In our view it has none of the attributes of property
in the usual sense of that term. 0
It is apparent from this recital of the characteristics lacking in an
advanced degree that the Supreme Court of Colorado and its suc-
cessors in various jurisdictions rely primarily on the inalienability
of the degree or license as a bar to its characterization as property,
a reversion to Blackstonian property theory no longer viable in
contemporary society. Conversely, under the Restatement view, an
owner's bundle of property rights may contain less than all the
available rights. 1 Therefore, one may possess certain property in-
terests in which he or she has no right of alienation, as in the case
of a life tenant of an inalienable life estate.2 Courts that persist in
justifying rejection of the graduate or professional degree or an ad-
vanced education as property by relying on traditional and limited
notions of property run afoul of legislative efforts to broaden the
definition of property and property rights deserving protection of
the law, particularly in marital dissolution actions. 3 Rather than
require an asset or interest to exhibit all the traditional character-
istics of property or lose its status as "property," the more progres-
sive view recognizes as a protectible property right any valuable
interest that public policy dictates should receive legal protection
of the property laws.54 Community property and equitable distri-
bution statutes reflect a public policy favoring recognition and pro-
tection of all valuable interests acquired by the spouses during the
marriage. Such statutes require that courts reflect modern con-
cepts of property as well. The provisions of the Uniform Marital
Property Act (hereinafter UMPA) are in accord with the Restate-
ment view. The UMPA's prefatory note discusses the underlying
propositions governing the Act:
50. Id. at 77.
51. Note, supra note 37, at 312.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Vandevelde, The New Property of the Nineteenth Century: The Devel-
opment of the Modern Concept of Property, 29 BUFFALO L. REv. 325 (1980).
1987]
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The first is the creation of an immediate sharing mode of owner-
ship. The second proposition is that the sharing mode during
marriage is an ownership right already in existence at the end of
the marriage. Thus, recognition and perfection of shared and
vested ownership rights in marital property are in place at di-
vorce or death. They do not have to come to fruition as a result of
a court-ordered and possibly adversary 'division' or by a statuto-
rily-sanctioned 'transfer.'5
The UMPA's premise is that property acquired during marriage is
shared and that a present vested ownership right is attached to all
property acquired by "the personal efforts of either during the
marriage.""8 The UMPA defines property as any quantifiable inter-
est "present or future, legal or equitable, vested or contingent, in
real or personal property. ' 57 The ABA's House of Delegates recom-
mended adoption of the UMPA in 198458 and, in April 1984, Wis-
consin adopted the Act, effective October 1, 1986. Legislation to
adopt the UMPA is pending in other jurisdictions. 9
North Carolina historically has adopted a broad view of prop-
erty rights that are to be afforded legal recognition and protection.
In Wilson v. Charlotte, the North Carolina Supreme Court stated:
"The word 'property' is not such a technical one, that if properly
used it has everywhere the same precise and definite meaning. Its
meaning varies according to the subject treated of, and according
to the context."' In Hildebrand v. Telegraph Co., the supreme
court noted, "[the] word 'property' extends to every aspect of right
and interest capable of being enjoyed as such upon which it is
practicable to place a money value." 1 ' North Carolina precedent
and the underlying purposes of the equitable distribution statute
suggest that the courts will interpret broadly the concept of prop-
erty ownership interest, both intangible and incorporeal, in a man-
55. Uniform Marital Property Act, Prefatory Note, 9A U.L.A. 21, 22 (1983).
56. Id. at 23.
57. Uniform Marital Property Act, supra note 55, at 26.
58. Uniform Marital Property Act, XI (15).
59. 1985 Survey of Family Law, supra note 36, at 3021.
60. 74 N.C. 748, 755 (1875).
61. 219 N.C. 402, 408, 14 S.E.2d 252, 256 (1941). Cf. Sarnet v. Farmers and
Merchant's Nat'l Bank, 247 F. 669, 671 (4th Cir. 1917) commonly used to denote
everything that is the subject of ownership, corporeal or incorporeal, tangible or
intangible, visible or invisible, real or personal, everything that has an exchangea-
ble value or that goes to make up the wealth of an estate. It extends to every
species of valuable right and interest and includes real and personal property,
easements, franchises, and incorporeal hereditaments.
[Vol. 10:69
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ner designed to be includable in the marital estate and potentially
subject to distribution.
A second failing of courts that cite to traditional property no-
tions is the tendency to ignore the fact that the category "marital
property" is a legislative creation, has no precedent in historical
property law, and should not be expected to fit within common-law
property definitions.62
It is a statutory creature, is of no meaning whatsoever during the
normal course of a marriage and arises full grown, like Athena,
upon the signing of a separation agreement or the commencement
of a matrimonial action. [Thus] it is hardly surprising, and not at
all relevant that traditional common-law property concepts do
not fit in parsing the meaning of 'marital property.'63
Chapter 50, Section 20(k) of the North Carolina General Statutes
in effect legislatively creates a category of property heretofore un-
known in North Carolina:
The rights of the parties to an equitable distribution of prop-
erty are a species of common ownership, the rights of the respec-
tive parties vesting at the time of the filing of the divorce action.64
In effect, marital property rights are inchoate rights, arising from
joint and several vested ownership rights during the marriage,
which accrue and become fixed when a spouse files for dissolution.
Although there are no appellate decisions interpreting section 50-
20(k), a literal understanding of the provision read in paria
materia would suggest an analysis similar to that found in the
UMPA.
Third, those states that hesitate to relinquish antiquated
property concepts in categorizing assets as property for the pur-
poses of equitable distribution or community property division ig-
nore the social and legislative history leading to the enactment of
modern marital dissolution statutes in nearly every state and the
District of Columbia.65 Many states that enacted equitable distri-
bution statutes were formerly "title" states, where upon divorce
the spouse who held the undivided title to property retained the
62. O'Brien v. O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d at 583, 489 N.E. at 715.
63. Florescue, Market Value, Professional Licenses and Marital Property: A
Dilemma in Search of a Horn, 1982 N.Y. State Bar Association, FAM. L. REV. 13
(Dec.)(emphasis added).
64. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(k) (1983) (emphasis added).
65. O'Brien v. O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d at 583, 489 N.E.2d at 717.
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asset free of any claim of his or her spouse. This "title" theory of
marital and separate property resulted in gross inequities to the
non-titled spouse who might have made significant monetary and
non-monetary contributions to the marriage. 6 To adjust the equi-
ties, the majority of state legislatures enacted equitable distribu-
tion and community property statutes that factored into the prop-
erty distribution equation consideration of all circumstances
relevant to the nature of the asset, its acquisition and value, to
determine a just division of assets in the dissolution action.'7
The conceptual underpinning of the North Carolina equitable
distribution statute is that marriage is a partnership in which there
are economic elements. Both spouses' contributions to the partner-
ship should be recognized and rewarded as a return on the invest-
ment as spouse, homemaker, wage-earner or parent and for con-
duct supportive of the other's education and career. The language
of the North Carolina statute significantly tracks the language of
section 236 of the New York Domestic Relations Law, which sets
out that state's equitable distribution procedures. North Carolina
has relied on New York precedent in its appellate rulings in the
equitable distribution field, and therefore the correlation of the
language of the New York statute to North Carolina's statute is
instructive in light of the O'Brien decision.68 In O'Brien, the New
York Court of Appeals analyzed the language of its domestic rela-
tions law with reference to whether a professional license earned
during marriage should be considered marital property.
Section 236 provides that in making an equitable distribution
of marital property 'the court shall consider: . . . (6) any equita-
ble claim to, interest in, or direct or indirect contribution made to
the acquisition of such marital property by the party not having
title, including joint efforts or expenditures and contributions and
services as a spouse, parent, wage-earner and homemaker, and to
the career or the career potential of the other party [and] . . .
(9) the impossibility or difficulty of evaluating any component as-
set or interest in a business; corporation, or profession'.. 69
North Carolina's statute provides:
Factors the court shall consider under this subsection are as
follows . . . (6) any equitable claim to, interest in, or direct or
66. 489 N.E.2d at 716.
67. Id.
68. 66 N.Y.2d 576, 489 N.E.2d 712.
69. Id. at 584, 489 N.E.2d at 715-16.
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indirect contribution made to the acquisition of such marital
property by the party not having title, including joint efforts or
expenditures and contributions and services, or lack thereof, as a
spouse, parent, wage-earner, or homemaker; (7) Any direct or in-
direct contribution made by one spouse to help educate or de-
velop the career potential of the other spouse; . . . (10) The diffi-
culty of evaluating any component asset or any interest in a
business, corporation or profession . . ..
Of this parallel language in the New York statute the New York
Court of Appeals stated:
The words mean exactly what they say: That an interest in a pro-
fession or professional career potential is marital property which
may be represented by direct or indirect contributions . . . made
by caring for the home and family. The Legislature has decided,
by its explicit reference in the statute to the contributions of one
spouse to the other's profession or career (citations omitted) that
these contributions represent investments in the economic part-
nership of the marriage and that the product of the parties' joint
efforts, the professional license should be considered marital
property. There is no reason in law or logic to restrict the plain
language of the statute to existing practices, however, for it is of
little consequence in making an award of marital property, except
for the purpose of evaluation, whether the professional spouse has
already established a practice or whether he or she has yet to do
SO. 
7 1
The essence of the North Carolina statute is that the contribu-
tions of both spouses, monetary and non-monetary, be recognized
and ultimately quantified. Given the remedial nature of the stat-
ute, the underlying marriage-as-partnership theory, and the broad
definition of property interests inherent in the statute itself, it
would be consistent for North Carolina, as New York and other
minority jurisdictions have done, to recognize the graduate or pro-
fessional degree as a property interest subject to equitable distri-
bution if the statutory requirements for a finding of "marital prop-
erty" are satisfied.
IV. COMPENSATION OF THE WORKING SPOUSE FOR CONTRIBUTIONS
TO THE ACQUISITION OF A STUDENT SPOUSE'S ADVANCED DEGREE
The majority of jurisdictions that have rejected the concept of
70. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(c)(6),(7),(10) (Cum. Supp. 1986).
71. O'Brien v. O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d at 584, 489 N.E.2d at 716.
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an advanced degree as property have developed varying responses
to the dilemma of fairly compensating the non-degree earning
spouse for his/her contributions to his/her spouse's acquisition of
the degree, which obviously will afford the student spouse en-
hanced future earning capacity.72 North Carolina adopted this re-
sponse in the appellate decision of Geer v. Geer. 73
A. Compensation by Alimony or Spousal Maintenance Awards
Spousal maintenance awards are generally based solely on the
actual monetary need of the dependent spouse.74 In a minority of
states, .marital misconduct is a complete bar to alimony or can
serve as a basis for reduction or disallowance of alimony. 75 While
compensation for investment in a professional degree earned by
one's spouse by means of a spousal maintenance award is intellec-
tually problematical in that maintenance is premised on considera-
tion of the actual monetary needs of the dependent spouse to
maintain the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage, it is
not intended to be a device to achieve financial parity between the
parties in the context of a property distribution. Nevertheless, a
substantial number of courts have looked to their spousal mainte-
nance statutes to effect economic justice in these circumstances.
Twenty-three76 states have enacted statutes permitting their trial
courts to award rehabilitative maintenance for a period of time to
enable the dependent spouse to become economically viable. How-
ever, many states have utilized their statutes for reimbursement
and property division purposes because of an unwillingness to rec-
ognize a graduate or professional degree as marital property.77 The
72. Supra notes 19-22.
73. 84 N.C. App. 471, 353 S.E.2d 427 (1987).
74. Freed and Walker, Family Law in the Fifty States: An Overview, 19 FAM.
L. Q. 331, 369 (1986).
75. Id. at 369; Alabama, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia,
Hawaii, Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mis-
souri, New Hampshire, North Carolina, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Rhode Is-
land, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia, and Pu-
erto Rico.
76. 1985 Survey of Family Law, 11 FAM. L.REv. 3015, 3017-18 (1985); Ari-
zona, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana (for
incapacitated spouse only), Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota, Mis-
souri, New Hampshire, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Vermont,
Washington, Wisconsin.
77. Hubbard v. Hubbard, 603 P.2d 747; Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 N.J. 488,
453 A.2d 527 (1982); Saint-Pierre v. Saint-Pierre, 357 N.W.2d 250 (S.D. 1984).
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Supreme Court of New Jersey justified this approach in an incon-
sistent analysis:
To provide a fair and effective means of compensating a sup-
porting spouse who has suffered a loss or reduction of support, or
has incurred a lower standard of living, or has been deprived of a
better standard of living in the future, the Court now introduces
the concept of reimbursment alimony in divorce proceedings.
This concept properly accords with the Court's belief that regard-
less of the appropriateness of permanent alimony or the presence
or absence of marital property to be equitably distributed, there
will be circumstances where a supporting spouse should be reim-
bursed for the financial contributions he or she made to the
spouse's successful professional training."8
A basic purpose of alimony relates to the quality of economic life
to which one spouse is entitled and which becomes the obligation
of the other. Alimony has to do with support and standard of liv-
ing. This approach's inconsistency was criticized in a subsequent
New Jersey case, Reiss v. Reiss,79 in which the court pointed out
that alimony and reimbursement are theoretically inapposite.
Alimony is 'future sustenance and support' for a divorced person
payable by a former spouse, Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed.
1979), and its award generally involves a determination of the fu-
ture needs of the recipient and the future ability of the former
spouse to pay. The past is relevant only to determine the stan-
dard of living to which the recipient became accustomed during
coverture. On the other hand, 'reimbursement' involves a deter-
mination of what was paid in the past. It has nothing to do with
the future needs of the recipient or the future income of the
payer. It is remarkably similar to the return of a financial ad-
vance or investment. Thus, the determination of alimony essen-
tially looks to the future, while reimbursement looks to the past.8 0
Awarding compensation as reimbursement alimony has the
advantages of non-dischargeability in bankruptcy proceedings, and
deductibility from the payor's gross income, provided the statutory
and regulatory requirements are met.8' Conversely, alimony awards
are includible in the income of the recipient, terminable upon re-
78. Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 N.J. at 501, 453 A.2d at 534; See also In re
Lundberg, 107 Wis. 2d 1; In re Weinstein, 128 Ill. App. 3d 234.
79. 200 N.J. 122, 490 A.2d 378 (1984).
80. Id. at 125, 490 A.2d at 379.
81. I.R.C. § 71, 215.
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marriage or death, are discretionary with the court, and difficult to
collect if paid over a period of years.82 In addition, alimony has the
nebulous quality of being modifiable, 3 an obvious disadvantage
and disincentive to the recipient spouse. Two jurisdictions recog-
nize that modifiability of an alimony award which in effect was a
distributive award arising out of a property division ultimately
could defeat the intention of the trial court to do equity between
the parties.8 4 These jurisdictions have ruled that reimbursement
alimony awards are not modifiable.
The use of the alimony statutes to award financial compensa-
tion to a non-student spouse is fraught with pitfalls common to
many jurisdictions. If North Carolina's alimony statutes were to be
utilized in this manner, the pitfalls would be self-evident. As a pre-
requisite to an award of alimony in North Carolina, the spouse
seeking support must affirmatively prove that the spouse from
whom alimony is sought is guilty of marital fault.8 5 The states
82. See generally L. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION (1985).
83. Lira v. Lira, 68 Ohio App. 2d 164; Stevens v. Stevens, 23 Ohio St. 2d 115.
84. Greer v. Greer, 32 Colo. App. 196, 510 P.2d 905; Reiss v. Reiss, 200 N.J.
122, 490 A.2d 378.
85. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.2 (Cum. Supp. 1986).
Grounds for Alimony: A dependent spouse is entitled to an order for
alimony when:
(1) The supporting spouse has commited adultery.
(2) There has been an involuntary separation of the spouses in conse-
quence of a criminal act committed by the supporting spouse prior to the
proceeding in which alimony is sought, and the spouses have lived sepa-
rate and apart for one year and the plaintiff or the defendant in the pro-
ceeding has resided in this State for six months.
(3) The supporting spouse has engaged in an unnatural or abnormal sex
act with a person of the same sex or of a different sex or with a beast.
(4) The supporting spouse abandons the dependent spouse.
(5) The supporting spouse maliciously turns the dependent spouse out of
doors.
(6) The supporting spouse by cruel or barbarous treatment endangers the
life of the dependent spouse.
(7) The supporting spouse offers such indignities to the person of the
dependent spouse as to render his or her condition intolerable and life
burdensome.
(8) The supporting spouse is a spendthrift.
(9) The supporting spouse is an excessive user of alcohol or drugs so as to
render the condition of the dependent spouse intolerable and the life of
the dependent spouse burdensome.
(10) The supporting spouse willfully fails to provide the dependent
spouse with necessary subsistence according to his or her means and con-
[Vol. 10:69
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break down relatively evenly with respect to considering marital
fault as a factor in the distribution of marital property. However,
North Carolina's equitable distribution statute, which contains no
legislative mandate requiring consideration of marital fault, has
been judicially interpreted to exclude consideration of marital fault
(such as would underlie an award of alimony) with the exception of
economic fault.86 Thus, to utilize the North Carolina alimony stat-
utes to effect compensation (in reality a property distribution or
reimbursement) would be antithetical to the purposes of the equi-
table distribution statute, which are to make property distribution
without reference to marital fault of the kind premised in the ali-
mony statutes. Additionally, the fault requirements of the alimony
statutes automatically would disqualify from reimbursement or'
distributive alimony awards spouses found to have committed
adultery87 and, potentially, those spouses found to have committed
lesser marital offenses.88
Another troublesome and limiting aspect to the utilization of
the alimony statutes to compensate the working spouse is the com-
mon requirement that an award of alimony be based on need.
Where courts require a working spouse to meet the threshold re-
quirements of dependency before awarding alimony,' it is unlikely
that the spouse who supported the student spouse and the family
for a period of years will meet basic dependency standards. In
North Carolina, the legislature requires the spouse seeking support
dition so as to render the condition of the dependent spouse intolerable
and the life of the dependent spouse burdensome. (citations omitted)
86. Hinton v. Hinton, 70 N.C. App. 665, 321 S.E.2d 161 (1984); Smith v.
Smith, 314 N.C. 80, 331 S.E.2d 682 (1985); Dusenberry v. Dusenberry, 314 N.C.
608, 335 S.E.2d 892 (1985).
87. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.6 (Cum. Supp. 1986) provides:
(a) Alimony or alimony pendente lite shall not be payable when adultery
is pleaded in bar of demand for alimony or alimony pendente lite made
in an action or cross action, and the issue of adultery is found against the
spouse seeking alimony . ...
88. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.5 (Cum. Supp. 1986) provides:
(b) Except as provided in G.S. 50-16.6 in case of adultery, the fact that
the dependent spouse has committed an act or acts which would be
grounds for alimony if such spouse were the supporting spouse shall be
grounds for disallowance of alimony or reduction in the amount of ali-
mony when pleaded in defense by the supporting spouse. (Citations
omitted).
89. In re Marriage of McVey, 641 P.2d 300 (Colo. Ct. App. 1981); DeLa Rosa
v. DeLa Rosa, 309 N.W. 2d 755 (Minn. 1981).
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to demonstrate dependency in addition to marital fault.90 This
statutory prerequisite has been interpreted to mean that a depen-
dent spouse must demonstrate that he or she is unable to maintain
his or her accustomed standard of living established in the several
years prior to the separation. 1 Because when the working spouse
supports the acquisition of her or his spouse's advanced degree the
marriage's early years are typically lean, it would be impossible for
a spouse seeking such an award to demonstrate a standard of living
which he or she had sacrificed in order to realize in the future.
Thus, without sweeping legislative changes, the North Carolina ali-
mony statutes appear to preclude use in effecting compensation by
a distributive alimony award to a working spouse who supported
the acquisition of his/her spouse's advanced degree. The Geer9 2
holding did not choose alimony as the appropriate means of com-
pensating the contributing spouse, and it is unlikely that later ap-
pellate decisions will find alimony an appropriate method of
achieving economic parity in the arena of the education degree.
B. Compensation by Restitution
A few courts have responded to the student/working-spouse
dilemma by formulating a theory of compensation for the working
spouse based on principles of restitution, as distinguished from the
theory of compensation based on reimbursement. In order to be
entitled to restitution, a working spouse would have to demon-
strate that the student spouse received a benefit by acquiring the
degree during the marriage, that he or she was unjustly enriched at
the expense of the working spouse, and that the student spouse
will retain all the benefits conferred by the degree to the exclusion
of the working spouse. In restitution theory, principles of fairness
and equity mandate that the spouse retaining the benefits of the
degree make compensation. 3 However, the mere fact that the stu-
dent spouse retains the benefit of the degree alone is insufficient -
90. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.1(3) (Cum. Supp. 1986) provides:
'Dependent spouse' means a spouse, whether husband or wife, who is ac-
tually substantially dependent upon the other spouse for his or her main-
tenance or support, or is substantially in need of support and mainte-
nance from the other spouse.
See also Pacht v. Judd, 13 Ohio App. 3d 363, 469 N.E.2d 918 (1983).
91. Williams v. Williams, 299 N.C. 174, 261 S.E.2d 849 (1980).
92. 84 N.C. App. 471, 353 S.E.2d 427 (1987).
93. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 1 (1937); Pyeatte v. Pyeatte, 135 Ariz.
346, 661 P.2d 196 (1982).
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the retention must be unjust."' The Supreme Court of Washington
rejected this approach in Washburn v. Washburn. 5 In Washburn,
the court reasoned that the necessity of a finding that the student
spouse had been unjustly enriched by the efforts of the working
spouse would invite introduction of evidence as to the relative
marital fault of the parties in the distribution proceeding. 6 While
the objection is of minimal concern in those jurisdictions that al-
ready permit introduction of fault evidence,9" in those states that
exclude all consideration of marital fault this approach would be
philosophically untenable. Some states, however, such as North
Carolina, allow introduction of evidence with regard to economic
fault. 8 The relevant evidence of unjust enrichment would necessa-
rily involve economic factors such as marital funds expended for
educational expenses and maintenance of the family, lost earnings
of the student spouse as well as lost income of the working spouse
who may have foregone career opportunities, current earning po-
tential of both spouses, and educational and other debts incurred
in support of the student spouse.9 9 Therefore, such evidence of un-
just enrichment would not be antithetical to the statute or judicial
interpretation. While that evidence would have substantial emo-
tional appeal in the typical situation where the student spouse
(usually the husband) leaves the working spouse because of in-
volvement with a third party,10 it has no economic relevance and
should be excluded. However, the disparity of the relative future
earning capacities of the spouses and foregone career advance-
ments or educational opportunities with consequent loss of past
and future earnings could easily establish economic "unjustness"
directly resulting from the investment of the marital community in
the student spouse's advanced degree. Clearly the restitution ap-
proach to compensation would not be precluded under the North
Carolina equitable distribution statute on the basis of economic
fault considerations.
A minority of jurisdictions have adopted the restitution ap-
proach to compensation."0 ' North Carolina is so far not among
94. Id.
95. 101 Wash. 2d 175, 226, 677 P.2d 152, 156-57 (1984).
96. Id. at 176, 677 P.2d at 157.
97. Freed and Walker, supra note 74, at 361.
98. Id. at 361; see supra note 85.
99. Washburn, 101 Wash. 2d 175, 677 P.2d 152.
100. Lynn, 91 N.J. 510, 453 A.2d 539.
101. Pyeatte v. Pyeatte, 135 Ariz. 346, 661 P.2d 196 (1982); DeLa Rosa v.
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them. However, while some of the cases frame the remedy in terms
of restitution and unjust enrichment, in effect these courts are
making reimbursement. 102 Conversely, some states utilizing the re-
imbursement theory of compensation for the working spouse in ef-
fect have fashioned a restitution-based remedy without any overt
reference to unjust enrichment.' 3 The distinction between the res-
titution and reimbursement remedies as articulated in the cases is
that reimbursement allows a straight recoupment of monies ex-
pended and income foregone, while restitution permits a working
spouse to realize the quantified present value of his or her contri-
butions to the attainment of the degree. 104 In Haugan v. Hau-
gan,105 the Supreme Court of Wisconsin discussed methods of com-
pensation available to a trial court to compensate appropriately a
wife who supported her husband through medical school and resi-
dency. The court explained the restitutional remedy:
One approach the trial court may consider is the cost value ap-
proach whereby it calculates the value of the supporting spouse's
contributions, not only in terms of money for education and living
expenses but also in terms of services rendered during the mar-
riage . . . the fair market value of homemaking services might be
considered along with . . . financial input. Furthermore, the trial
court should consider adjusting the value of the supporting
spouse's contributions by a fair rate of return or for inflation.
Such an award is restitutionary in nature.0 6
Only by including a calculation of the present value of the mone-
tary and quantifiable non-monetary contributions of the working
spouse to attainment of the student spouse's degree, as of the time
that the distribution of property is to become effective, can restitu-
tion effectively be achieved.
Some courts and commentators have also been supportive of
an approach to compensation denominated the "opportunity cost"
DeLa Rosa, 309 N.W.2d 755 (Minn. 1981); Hubbard v. Hubbard, 603 P.2d 747
(Okla. 1979); Cf. In re Lundberg, 107 Wis. 2d 1, 318 N.W.2d 918 (1982); Inman v.
Inman, 648 S.W.2d 847 (Ky. 1982).
102. See supra cases at note 100.
103. See infra § IV C of this article.
104. Cf. Hubbard v. Hubbard, 603 P.2d 747 (Okla. 1979), where the support-
ing spouse was awarded present value of contributions to direct support and
school and professional training expenses plus reasonable adjustments for
inflation.
105. 117 Wis. 2d 200, 211, 343 N.W.2d 796, 802 (1984).
106. Id. at 211, 343 N.W.2d at 803.
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approach.107 This theory recognizes and compensates for income
lost by the family unit when the student spouse attends school
rather than continuing employment, or for income foregone by the
family unit when the working spouse takes a lower paying position
to relocate with the student spouse or forfeits promotional oppor-
tunities. '0 8 The inclusion of quantifiable lost income of either
spouse which was a direct result of the student spouse, attending
school fits neatly within the restitution theory in dissolution
actions.
North Carolina's equitable distribution statute mandates con-
sideration by the court of "direct or indirect contributions" to the
education or career potential of the other spouse."0 9 Although the
North Carolina Court of Appeals did not utilize the restitutionary
framework in Geer,"0 the statutory language is in place to justify a
broad restitution approach. This writer suggests that, since the
North Carolina court has not thus far indicated its willingness to
recognize the professional degree as property, restitution is an ap-
propriate means of compensation under the statute. Such compen-
sation should include "lost opportunity" income as a justifiable
"indirect contribution."
C. Compensation by Reimbursement
A number of courts, including North Carolina, have approved
the theory of reimbursement in the context of a property division
to compensate the working spouse for contributions to the acquisi-
tion of the student spouse's advanced degree. Some courts that ac-
tually have awarded a form of reimbursement to the working
spouse have denominated their remedy as restitution. This is a
misnomer. Black's Law Dictionary defines reimbursement as re-
payment for that which is expended, or making one whole."' Res-
titution, on the other hand, is defined as restoration of both parties
to their original condition, or the act of giving equivalent for
loss." 2 A classic example of this malapropism is found in the often
cited case of DeLa Rosa v. DeLa Rosa.113 In DeLa Rosa, the wife
107. Id. at 213, 343 N.W.2d at 803.
108. Id.
109. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(c)(7) (1984).
110. 84 N.C. App. 471, 353 S.E.2d 427 (1987).
111. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1157 (5th ed. 1979).
112. Id. at 1180-81.
113. 309 N.W.2d 755 (Minn. 1981).
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worked full-time to support her husband through the balance of
his undergraduate education and two and one-half years of medical
school before the parties separated. The husband obtained his
medical degree after the dissolution of the marriage. '1 4 In its opin-
ion, the Minnesota Supreme Court, while denominating the rem-
edy as restitutional in nature, stated:
It is this court's view that the award should have been limited to
the monies expended by respondent for petitioner's living ex-
penses and any contributions made toward petitioner's direct
educational costs. To achieve this result, we subtract from re-
spondent's earnings her own living expenses. This has the effect
of imputing one-half of the living expenses and all the educa-
tional expenses to the student spouse. The formula subtracts
from respondent's contributions one-half of the couple's living ex-
penses, that amount being the contributions of the two parties
which were not used for direct educational costs .... 115
This formula achieves nothing more than a return of monies ex-
pended by the working spouse. It makes no adjustment for the pre-
sent value of the expended funds. In DeLa Rosa, the wife had pro-
vided support to the husband from 1972 to 1977 while he attended
school. However, she did not receive any funds from the reim-
bursement award (or interest thereon) until 1981, nearly ten years
after the initial contributions were made and four years after the
parties separated. Clearly, the reimbursement award in DeLa Rosa
not only was not adequate but was not restitution. Similarly in
Lehmicke v. Lehmicke"6 the court adopted the equitable princi-
ples articulated in Mahoney v. Mahoney where the New Jersey Su-
preme Court awarded compensation to the working wife of a stu-
dent spouse through reimbursement alimony."' In Lehmicke, the
allowable items of reimbursement were monetary contributions to-
ward the student spouse's educational costs including household
expenses, education-travel related expenses, and "other contribu-
tions"' 8 accepted by the student spouse. In addition, the court
considered the parties' relative contributions to the support of a
child born while Dr. Lehmicke pursued his degree." 9 The court
114. Id. at 756.
115. Id. at 759.
116. 339 Pa. Super. 559, 489 A.2d 782 (1985).
117. Id. at 564, 489 A.2d at 787; see infra § IV C of this article.
118. Id., citing Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 N.J. 488, 453 A.2d 527 (1982).
119. Id. at 564, 489 A.2d at 787.
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made no provision to assess the present value of the enumerated
expenditures even though Mrs. Lehmicke's financial support of her
husband's educational pursuits lasted from 1970 to 1973, and the
final decision in the case was not rendered until 1985.120
The theory of compensation by reimbursement was raised to
new heights of confusion in Inman v. Inman.12' While ostensibly
approving the reimbursement theory, it made nonsense of the
property and reimbursement theory.
This Court cannot accept the proposition that an educational
degree received by one spouse while the other spouse contributes
financially to the cost of obtaining the degree is, upbn a dissolu-
tion of their marriage, marital property. We do, however, recog-
nize the issue of how to fairly compensate a person who has sup-
ported his or her spouse while the other spouse was in school,
when the marriage is dissolved before the family is able to realize
the benefits from the spouse's advanced education .... If the
issue were before this court, we would be constrained to the view
that the proper formula to be followed in placing a value on an
educational degree secured by a spouse to which the other spouse
contributed financially is to measure the recovery by the amount
of money the non-college going spouse contributed toward living
expenses, the amount of money contributed for educational costs,
and the potential for increase in future earning capacity made
possible by the degree, thus not treating the degree as marital
property.1 2
2
Obviously, the value of the advanced degree is quantified by calcu-
lating enhanced earning capacity. The distinction between the
value of an advanced degree per se and the value of the enhanced
earning capacity resulting from the acquisition of the degree is se-
mantic at best. To declare that the professional degree is not prop-
erty and then to place a value on that degree with reference to the
potential increase in earning capacity made possible by the degree
is anomalous.
123
120. Lehmicke v. Lehmicke, 339 Pa. Super. 559, 489 A.2d 782 (1985).
121. 648 S.W.2d 847 (Ky. 1982).
122. Id. at 852. (emphasis added).
123. The converse analysis is presented in an article by Mullenix, The Valua-
tion of an Educational Degree at Divorce, 16 LOYOLA L.A.L. REV. 227 (1983),
where the author in the process of valuing an educational degree promotes a resti-
tution theory of compensation. Mullenix engrafts the labor theory on valuation of
an educational degree, i.e., the value of an education is the labor time it took to
acquire it, and what the student spouse owes back to the family at the time of
divorce. Thus the working spouse becomes entitled to support at fifty percent of
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In In re Marriage of Sullivan,124 the Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia withheld opinion on an appeal from the trial court's denial
of compensation for the wife's contributions to her husband's pro-
fessional education during marriage, in deference to pending legis-
lation amending California's Family Law Act. The amendment to
the Family Law Act provides for reimbursement to the community
for "community contributions to education or training of a party
that substantially enhances the earning capacity of a party."'2 5
the professional spouse's actual income for the same period of time it took for the
student spouse to 'earn the degree. This entitlement would be awarded without
regard to the direction of the marriage or accumulation of other assets. This ap-
proach ignores the realities obvious to any practitioner: (1) the student spouse's
income must be tracked annually for a period of years; (2) the student spouse's
income may be minimal for the early years of practice; or (3) the spouse may
defer or depress his income for the allowed time period. These writers' primary
objection to Mullenix's approach is that there is simply no rational relationship to
or reward of the working spouse's non-monetary or monetary contributions.
124. 37 Cal. 3d 762, 209 Cal. Rptr. 354, 691 P.2d 1020 (1984).
125. Id. at 767, 691 P.2d at 1023, nn. 3-4, quoting CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 4800,
4800.3, 4801 (West 1984) (as amended). That section provides further in pertinent
part:
3. Chapter 1661 amended sections 4800 and 4801 of the Civil Code and
added section 4800.3. At the time of filing of this opinion, the changes
had not been published in code form. Accordingly, the citations in this
opinion are to session and chapter members.
4. The reimbursement provision states in full: Section 4800.3 is added to
the Civil Code, to read:
(a) As used in this section, 'community contributions to education or
training' means payments made with community property for education
or training or for the repayment of a loan incurred for education or
training.
(b) Subject to the limitations provided in this section, upon dissolution
of marriage or legal separation:
(1) The community shall be reimbursed for community contribu-
tions to education or training of a party that substantially enhances the
earning capacity of the party. The amount reimbursed shall be with in-
terest at the legal rate accruing from the end of the calendar year in
which the contributions were made.
(2) A loan incurred during marriage for the education or training of
a party shall not be included among the liabilities of the community for
the purpose of division pursuant to Section 4800 but shall be assigned for
payment by the party.
(c) The reimbursement and assignment required by this section shall be
reduced or modified to the extent circumstances render such a disposi-
tion unjust, including but not limited to any of the following:
(1) The community has substantially benefited from the education,
training or loan incurred for the education or training of the party. There
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Based on the amendment to the California Family Law Act, the
California Supreme Court reversed and remanded with instruc-
tions to calculate appropriate reimbursement compensation to the
wife. Pursuant to Section 4800.3(b)(1) of the California Civil Code,
reimbursement must include "interest at the legal rate accruing
from the end of the calendar year in which the contributions were
made." '126 While the California reimbursement statute does not ad-
dress calculation of the present value of contributions by the work-
ing spouse, allowing interest will result in a closer approximation
of present value and a fairer adjustment between the parties. The
idea of reimbursement in equitable distribution and community
property decisions is, unfortunately, rarely well thought out,12 and
little meaningful guidance was available for the North Carolina
Court of Appeals to consider when it adopted the reimbursement
theory of compensation in Geer v. Geer.1 28
Geer solidly embraces the reimbursement theory, and the
holding is clearly patterned after decisions of other states. 29 How-
ever, Geer suffers a major flaw in its treatment of reimbursement
economics.
is a rebuttable presumption, affecting the burden of proof, that the com-
munity has not substantially benefited from community contributions to
the education or training made less than 10 years before the commence-
ment of the proceeding. ...
(2) The education or training received by the party is offset by the
education or training received by the other party for which community
contributions have been made.
(3) The education or training enables the party receiving the educa-
tion or training to engage in gainful employment that substantially
reduces the need of the party for support that would otherwise be
required.
(d) Reimbursement for community contributions and assignment of
loans pursuant to this section is the exclusive remedy of the community
or a party for the education or training and any resulting enhancement
of the earning capacity of a party. However, nothing in this subdivision
shall limit consideration of the effect of the education, training or en-
hancement, or the amount reimbursed pursuant to this section, on the
cirsumstances of the parties for the purpose of an order for support pur-
suant to Section 4801.
(e) This section is subject to an express written agreement of the
parties to the contrary.
126. 691 P.2d at 1023.
127. See supra notes 95-101 and accompanying text.
128. 84 N.C. App. 471, 353 S.E.2d 427 (1987).
129. Inman v. Inman, 648 S.W.2d 847; Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 N.J. 488, 453
A.2d 527; DeLa Rosa v. DeLa Rosa, 309 N.W.2d 755.
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The court of appeals' decision in Geer is logically consistent
with North Carolina's equitable distribution statute. Our state's
equitable distribution statute, while expressly treating professional
licenses as separate property, also expressly states that a court
must consider in equitable distribution actions "[a]ny direct or in-
direct contribution made by one spouse to help educate or develop
the career potential of the other spouse. 1 30 The North Carolina
Court of Appeals in Geer based its decision to affirm the trial
court's order of reimbursement for the contributing spouse on this
statute and allowed reimbursement for both direct and indirect
contributions made by the contributing spouse to the professional
spouse's education.13" '
In Geer, the wife supported her husband throughout his un-
dergraduate education. Later, the wife continued her education in
medical school, and her husband gave up his job so he could move
out of state with her. The husband was subsequently unable to
find commensurate employment, but he contributed to the family
support throughout the years that the wife was in medical school.
The wife also worked during her graduate education to support the
family unit. 3 '
The trial court in Geer ordered the plaintiff/wife to execute a
deed to the marital residence to the defendant/husband as a
method of satisfying reimbursement to the husband for his contri-
butions to the plaintiff's advanced degree.133 Considered as reim-
bursable "costs of medical education" by the trial court were mov-
ing costs, extra child care costs, costs in selling homes, and tuition
and supplied expenses.13'
The appellate court recognized the contributions of both
plaintiff and defendant in defraying the costs of the plaintiff's
medical education and remanded to the trial court that portion of
the judgment allowing the defendant credit only for his contribu-
tions. '3 Also, the North Carolina Court of Appeals disallowed
costs of the sale of two homes as indirect costs of the medical edu-
cation but allowed moving costs and extra child care costs to be
included in the category of indirect costs of the plaintiff's
130. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(c)(7) (1981).
131. 84 N.C. App. at 478, 353 S.E.2d at 431.
132. 84 N.C. App. 471, 473-74, 353 S.E.2d 427, 428-29.
133. Id. at 474, 475, 353 S.E.2d at 429.
134. Id. at 477, 353 S.E.2d at 430.
135. 84 N.C. App. 471, 479-80, 353 S.E.2d 427, 432.
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education. 36
The serious flaw in the Geer decision is that the court of ap-
peals failed to award to Mr. Geer reimbursement equivalent to the
present value of his out-of-pocket expenditures. 3 Absent a pre-
sent value calculation, Mr. Geer could not be made whole, since
the 1987 reimbursement came fully nine years past the monies
spent in contribution. Basic economic theory dictates that such an
adjustment be made in order to achieve a balance of reimburse-
ment and compensation.
Geer also falls short, though not as seriously, in its failure to
recognize non-monetary contributions of one spouse to the other's
professional education. Though perhaps not as readily quantifiable
as out-of-pocket expenditures, the contributions of homemaking
and child care are certainly an essential part of maintaining the
family unit during the professional spouse's education. Govern-
ment publications are replete with calculations of the value of
homemaker/child care worker labor, and these types of data pro-
vide a solid basis for quantifying such non-monetary contributions
to the degree acquisition.
D. Compensation by Property Division
A minority of states denying recognition of a degree as prop-
erty subject to distribution have resolved the compensation issue
by making disproportionate awards to the working spouse from the
assets of the marital estate, often with additional distributive cash
awards. The difficulty with disproportionate property distribution
in the context of compensating the non-degree earning spouse is
that, typically, all the marital resources have been channeled into
educational costs and family maintenance, with the result that
there is little accumulation of potentially distributable marital as-
sets. The decisions of several cases where the remedy was a dispro-
portionate property distribution reveal that some assets had been
accumulated that constituted a marital estate. In In re the Mar-
riage of Weinstein, the parties had accumulated a marital estate
worth $120,000.00. 18 After declaring that the husband's graduate
degree was not a marital asset, the court awarded sixty-two per-
cent of the marital estate to the wife, and thirty-eight percent to
136. Id. at 480, 353 S.E.2d at 432.
137. 84 N.C. App. 471, 480, 353 S.E.2d 427, 432.
138. 128 111. App. 3d 234, 470 N.E.2d 551, 554 (1984).
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the husband.' 9 Similarly, in Wilcox v. Wilcox,140 a wife was
awarded 100 percent of the total marital assets and an additional
$3,000.00 in cash"" when the court ruled that the future earnings
of the husband, a tenured professor, were not property subject to
distribution upon dissolution. 1" 2 In one case where the court or-
dered a $12,000.00 "property settlement"" 3 which caused the wife
to receive in excess of 100 percent of the marital assets, the Mis-
souri Court of Appeals specifically noted that the husband had in
excess of $18,000.00 in separate property from which to pay the
award.'4 4 Clearly, this remedy has only limited utility which is se-
verely limited by a minimal or non-existent marital estate or by a
student spouse with little liquidity in separate property.
North Carolina's equitable distribution statute provides for a
distributive award "in order to achieve equity between the par-
ties."" 31 5 Thus, North Carolina trial courts could utilize a combina-
tion of an unequal property division and an installment cash award
to compensate a working spouse who is found to have made sub-
stantial monetary and non-monetary contributions in support of a
student spouse's attainment of his/her educational goals.
V. VALUATION OF A GRADUATE OR PROFESSIONAL DEGREE
A number of those courts, having determined that the profes-
sional license or degree may not be fairly characterized as property
capable of distribution, have advanced the argument that the valu-
ation of a license or degree, or the future earning capacity to be
derived therefrom, is too speculative and cannot be accurately
quantified for purposes of distribution. 6 The primary rationale is
that the valuation of such an event as the initiation or continua-
139. Id. at 246, 470 N.E.2d at 555.
140. 173 Ind. App. 661, 365 N.E.2d 792 (1977).
141. Id. at 666, 365 N.E.2d at 794.
142. See also Grosskopf v. Grosskopf, 677 P.2d 814 (Wyo. 1984), where the
trial court divided a marital estate of $72,000.00 equally but assigned liabilities of
nearly $45,000.00 to the husband resulting in a net negative liability of approxi-
mately $9,000.00 as the husband's marital share.
143. Scott v. Scott, 645 S.W.2d 193 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
144. Id. at 197.
145. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(e)(1984).
146. Hughes v. Hughes, 438 So. 2d 146, 150 (Fla. 1983); In re Marriage of
Weinstein, 128 Ill. App. 3d 284, 470 N.E.2d 551; Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 N.J.
488, 496, 453 A.2d 527; Lehmicke v. Lehmicke, 339 Pa. Super. 559, 489 A.2d 782,
788.
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tion of a professional practice, or of such an uncertain amount as
the worth of the degree over an indeterminate duration of practice,
is so uncertain as to be meaningless. 47 In Lesman v. Lesman, the
New York Appellate Court wrote:
[I]t is almost impossible to predict what amount of enhanced
earnings, if any, will result from a professional education. The de-
gree of financial success attained by those holding a professional
degree varies greatly. Some even may earn less from their profes-
sional practices than they could have earned from non-profes-
sional work. Moreover, others, due to choice or factors beyond
their control, may never practice their profession. 48
While it cannot be argued that the valuation of a professional
degree or license may be more difficult than the valuation of cer-
tain tangible assets, the valuation of intangible property interest
has been successfully performed by courts since the turn of the
century. In such heavily litigated issues as future earning capacity
in wrongful death or personal injury cases and the goodwill in-
volved in a professional practice, the North Carolina courts have
managed to tackle valuation with apparent agility and with satis-
factory results. 4 9 Other jurisdictions have recorded similar success
in these and other areas of litigation, including pain and suffering
and mental distress. 15 0
One commentator analogizes the valuation of the professional
degree to valuation of money, noting that what is being measured
in both cases are things not intrinsic to the physical items but the
"exchangeability" of money and education as a socially imputed
value.' 5' The readily ascertainable value of money is provided by
the currency itself, but the actual value itself is as fully intangible
147. Id.
148. Lesman v. Lesman, 88 App. Div. 2d 153, 452 N.Y.S.2d 935, 938-39
(1982).
149. See Hunt v. Wooten, 238 N.C. 42, 76 S.E.2d 326 (1953)(valuing future
lost wages in a personal injury action); Draughon v. Draughon, 82 N.C. App. 738,
347 S.E.2d 871 (1986)(valuing the goodwill of a landscaping business).
150. Hoffman v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 850 (M.D. Pa. 1974) (future
earning capacity in personal injury action); Snodgrass v. Nelson, 369 F. Supp.
1206 (D.S.D.), aff'd, 503 F.2d 94 (8th Cir. 1974)(valuation of damages based on
future earnings in wrongful death case). See also C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON
DAMAGES 86, 95-96 (1935).
151. Fitzpatrick and Doucette, Can the Economic Value of an Education Be
Measured? A Guide for Marital Property Dissolution, 21 J. oF FAM. L. 511, 514
(1982-83).
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as the value of education. 152 These commentators note that both
the methodology and the statistics necessary to measure enhanced
earning capacity improved by a degree have long been utilized by
courts. 153 Courts which have recognized the professional degree or
license as property subject to distribution acknowledge the similar-
ity of these cases to others where intangibles have been evaluated,
and these courts are singularly unimpressed by the argument that
current valuation techniques are inappropriate or inadequate.""
That education has an economic value is established by
United States Department of Commerce statistics 155 which demon-
strate that the greater the number of years of education, the
greater the individual's earning capacity.' 56 The next step is to
measure the difference between the earning capacity prior to earn-
ing the degree and the earning capacity demonstrated or expected
upon its attainment. 57 The following valuation methods have been
utilized by courts to calculate the value of an advanced or profes-
sional degree.
In order to determine the portion of future earnings subject to
distribution upon marital dissolution, two preliminary steps must
be taken: (1) a determination of the future earning capacity of the
student spouse as of the date of the parties' separation, taking into
account the degreed spouse's age; and (2) determination of the
portion of earnings attributable to the educational degree. 8
A. Establishing Actual Future Earning Expectancy
The process begins by determining future earning expectancy
based on age and annual rate of income calculated from the sepa-
ration date as well as the expected length of future employment;
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Woodworth v. Woodworth, 337 N.W.2d 332, 336 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983);
Reen v. Reen, 8 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 2193 (Feb. 9, 1982); O'Brien v. O'Brien, 66
N.Y.2d 576, 498 N.Y.S. 2d 743, 489 N.W.2d 712.
155. U.S. Dept. of Com. Bureau of the Census, Social and Economic Statis-
tics Admin., Current Publication Reports: Consumer Income, Series P-60, No. 92
(Mar. 1974).
156. Fitzpatrick and Doucette, supra note 151, at 515, citing the U. S. De-
partment of Commerce finding that: "on the average, a person with an elementary
school education has a lifetime earnings expectancy of approximately $325,000.00
in 1972 dollars. The corresponding figure for a high school graduate is
$450,000.00, and for a college graduate $725,000.00."
157. Id. at 516.
158. Id.
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both are ascertained from data relating to the particular profe-
sion.159 These factors are overlaid by the variables of inflation, la-
bor productivity, and the professional's "age-earning" cycle (a sta-
tistic which takes into account advancing age, education, and
experience). 160 From these calculations, a total future income fig-
ure is reached. The total future income figure is then adjusted to
factor in the possibility that the professional may die or become
disabled prior to realization of the total future income. Finally, the
adjusted future income is discounted to "present value," a figure
which reflects the theoretical interest earned by the future income
and the inflation rate that will operate upon the future income. 61
B. Establishing Proportion of Future Earnings Attributable to
the Educational Degree
The value of a degree is the difference between the degree-
enhanced earning capacity (as established by the above calcula-
tion) and the earning capacity of the individual, at the same pre-
sent age, had he or she foregone the advanced educational oppor-
tunity represented by the degree.' 62 To calculate the figure for the
annual income for the individual's work without the professional
degree and the annual income with the degree, statistics must be
obtained from the Bureau of Labor pertinent to the professions in
the location where the individual is and will be employed. The in-
come for the professional after the degree and before the degree
will be affected differently by the overlaid factor of the age-earning
cycle. '6 The final step is to apply the subtraction process de-
scribed earlier, namely to subtract from the present value amount
of the professional's future earnings expectancy with the degree
the present value amount of the future earnings expectancy had
the individual continued at the employment for which he/she
would have qualified without the degree. 64 The result is the pre-
sent value of the professional degree, the intervening factor be-
tween the two levels of employment.' 65
159. Id. at 517.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 518.
163. Id. at 519.
164. Id. at 520.
165. Id.
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C. Establishing the Portion of the Professional Degree Includ-
able in the Marital Estate
Two methods have been developed for determining the por-
tion of the degree attributable to the efforts and expenditures of
the marital community. The first and less complicated strategy in-
volves comparing the number of marital years during the degree
process to the total number of years necessary to obtain the degree
and applying the pro-rated number as a fraction to the total eco-
nomic value of the professional degree."6 This method presumes
that each year of the professional degree process has an equivalent
impact upon the increased ability to earn attributable to the de-
gree."'7 The resulting calculation is as follows:
Present Value of
Present Value of _ % of Marital Years Degree Attributable
Education Degree Invested in Degree to AriEtaeto Marital Estate
The second method is to calculate the difference between the
individual's earning capacity with the professional degree and the
earning capacity of the individual who theoretically left profes-
sional education on the date of marriage.16 8 An added variable ap-
pears with this formulation in those cases where a portion of the
education has already been completed when the marriage begins.
Therefore, the added year(s) of professional education must be fac-
tored in and the total educational years, while not sufficient for the
professional degree, may be analogized to a Master's Degree in the
degree field. 69 The valuation procedure remains the same as previ-
ously detailed, so that the present value of future earning capacity
with a Master's Degree is subtracted from the present value of the
future earning capacity with the completed professional degree.'
The result is the present value of future earning capacity or the
professional degree acquired during the marriage and subject to
distribution upon marital dissolution. "'
D. Analysis of the Degree Valuation Methods
These two methods for valuing a professional degree appear to
166. Id.
167. Id. at 520-21.
168. Id. at 520.
169. Id. at 521.
170. Id. at 522.
171. Id.
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be the most financially accurate and equitably satisfying answers
to the educational degree valuation problem facing modern
courts. 17 2 Several courts' objection that such valuation is errone-
ously based upon earnings accumulated after the marriage dissolu-
tion ' 3 is without substance since all future earning calculations are
discounted to present value and since the essence of the increased
earning capacity, the earning of the degree itself, occurred during
the marriage. Also, in this context, most reimbursement or restitu-
tionary awards are garnered from post-marital earnings, and most
distributive awards involve some use of post-marital income.
One criticism of the degree valuation formula is that it fails to
take into account the fact that the working spouse was denied use
of income that the student spouse could have earned if he or she
had been employed, which could have been used to purchase tangi-
ble marital assets, make investments, or support a higher standard
of living. 7 This criticism, however, is incompatible with the un-
derlying premises of the degree-as-property approach. First, degree
valuation seeks to reward spousal sacrifice during the degree earn-
ing period and to account for contributions of the marriage com-
munity toward the final product of increased earning capacity. To
award the supporting spouse lost income in addition to a marital
share of the present value of the educational degree would allow a
double recovery by the working spouse. Recognizing and valuing
the degree encompasses all elements of the marital community's
investment in the degree and makes a reasonable return on that
investment.
Another criticism of the degree valuation approach is that
where the divorce occurs years after the degree is obtained, the
value of the degree merges with the value of goodwill of a profes-
sional practice, so that the apparent separation of the degree from
goodwill achieved in the future earning capacity calculation is
flawed, and again a double recovery may be allowed. 5 However,
this objection ignores the fact that, while goodwill is undeniably
linked to the cumulative impact of individual talent, which ac-
172. Mitchell, Family Law: Professional Degrees in 1986 - Family Sacrifice
Equals Family Asset, 25 WASHBURN L.J. 276, 286 (1986).
173. See Archer v. Archer, 303 Md. 347, 493 A.2d 1074 (1985); Mahoney v.
Mahoney, 91 N.J. 488, 453 A.2d 527; Saint-Pierre v. Saint-Pierre, 357 N.W.2d 250
(S.D. 1984); DeWitt v. DeWitt, 98 Wis. 2d 44, 296 N.W.2d 761 (1980).
174. Mitchell, supra note 172, at 286.
175. Oldham, Property Division in O'Brien: Good Intentions Gone Astray, 9
FAMILY ADVOCATE, No. 2, 11-13 (1986).
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counts for much greater variation of a professional practice, the
value of a degree can be separated from the value of the profes-
sional practice. 17 6 Professional practice valuation involves the mea-
surement of the worth of such factors as efficiency and good man-
agement as well as goodwill. On the other hand, valuation of a
degree or license measures the investment in human capital. 177
It may be more accurate to use the license or degree valuation
only in situations where the professional practice is in its early
stages. This limiting of the degree valuation is based upon the rela-
tive influence of the professional education as compared with the
influence of experience on the earnings of a professional prac-
tice. 17 8 It has been established (and is consistent with human expe-
rience) that:
[A]fter about five years, experience, reputation, contacts, privi-
leges, and personal politics become dominant factors in establish-
ing a professional practice. Thus, the relative contribution attrib-
utable to the education, degree, or license lessens over time and
eventually disappears. T7 9
As a matter of fact, limiting the incidents of degree valuation in
this manner is entirely consistent with the rationale for including
the educational degree or license as property. In marital circum-
stances where one spouse supports the other during a course of
professional degree program only to be divorced shortly after the
other's receipt of the professional degree, there is very little tradi-
tional marital property to distribute. In recognition of the inequi-
ties created by this situation, coupled with the realization that the
professional degree is an item of both present and future value,
some courts began to treat the professional degree as part of the
marital estate that could be valued and distributed upon the disso-
176. Zaumeyer, Valuation Advice: Keep License and Practice Apart, 9 FAM-
ILY ADVOCATE, No. 2, 19-23 (1986).
177. Id. at 20.
178. Id.
179. Id. This table reflects the relative influence of professional education in
light of experience on earnings growth during the early years of professional
careers:
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lution of the marriage.180
One analysis of the degree as a valuable marital asset appears
to figure most accurately the place of the student degree among
the property of a marriage. This analysis builds on a long-recog-
nized economic principle of future productivity value, that is,
human capital. 181 Human capital is the collection of talent, skills,
and knowledge that increases productivity; therefore, human capi-
tal is viewed by these theorists as wealth.18 2 Therefore, the invest-
Experience
Degree of
Influence
(Earnings)
C CostsGoodwill
Education
1 3 5* 7 9 11
Years in Practice
*Estimated merger point of license and practice, which
can vary with type of license, market for competitive
services, individual practitioner characteristics, etc.
180. See supra notes 11-14. In In re Marriage of Horstmann, 263 N.W.2d
885, 891 (Iowa 1978), the Iowa Supreme Court recognized that the husband's legal
education was the only significant marital asset. The court stopped short of term-
ing the education "property" subject to distribution but cited the "potential for
increase in future earnings capacity made possible by the law degree and certifi-
cate of admission conferred upon the husband with the aid of his wife's efforts
which constitutes the asset for distribution by the court."
These writers contend that there is no cognizable distinction between the
value of the degree and the "potential for increase in future earning capacity
made possible by the degree . . . ." Id.
181. Kranskopf, Recompense For Financing Spouse's Education: Legal Pro-
tection For the Marital Investor in Human Capital, 28 KAN. L. REv. 379 (1980).
182. Id. at 381. The theory is recognized in writings as early as Plato's. The
rebirth of the concept, according to Kranskopf, is attributed to Theodore W.
Shultz's premise that Western society engages in deliberate investment of skills
and knowledge and that the dramatic economic growth of our society is attributa-
ble to a rise in human capital per worker.
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ment in human capital is to be encouraged on public policy
principles.183
In applying the human capital concept to the family setting,
the family is viewed as a "firm" that seeks to maximize its collec-
tive welfare.184 When one spouse decides to return for education
with the financial support of the employed spouse, there are cer-
tain ecomonically significant events common to each family situa-
tion. First, the student spouse's potential earnings will be foregone
during the period of schooling, the "investment" period. Second,
the supporting spouse will provide the financial underwriting to al-
low the student spouse to forego the earnings. Third, the support-
ing spouse often foregoes other economically beneficial opportuni-
ties available to himself or herself during this investment. Finally,
the family unit has an expectation of future gain, a return on the
investment that will continue throughout the rest of the mar-
riage." 5 The early dissolution of such a marriage causes the sup-
porting spouse, the investor, to lose the expected return on the in-
vestment that would have resulted to the family unit had the
marriage continued, and it creates unjust enrichment for the stu-
dent spouse. 8 '
Allowing recompense for the supporting spouse upon the dis-
solution of the marriage is consistent with traditional notions of
property recognized in tort and contract law. 87 More importantly,
recompense futhers the public and familial good by encouraging
183. Id. at 380.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Professor Kranskopf notes by example the legal protection afforded a
person's proprietary interest in his own skills in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard
Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977). In contract law, protection of commercial
investments allows for recovery of reliance and expectation interests. Kranskopf
relates also the protection of personal skills in the entertainment and sports areas
by personal managing statutes. See Kranskopf, supra note 181, at 388-91. Unjust
enrichment principles can be easily applied to the marital relationship as well.
The remedy most appropriate, under this view, is not measured by costs to the
person conferring the benefit, as the cost in this context confers a much larger
profit to the recipient. In the degree situation the remedy that fits the wrong most
closely is the constructive trust, according to Kranskopf. The constructive trust
forces the disgorging of profit if there has been an increase in property value due
to the benefit conferred. Elements necessary to impose this equitable remedy pre-
sent in the student/supporting spouse context are: 1) confidential relationship; 2)
a promise; 3) transfer in reliance thereon; and 4) unjust enrichment.
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investment in human capital. 8 '
Current "no-fault" divorces and accompanying economic set-
tlement plans provide for maintenance through property division.
Such settlements are deemed preferable to alimony, since property
division is final and nonmodifiable, payment is more certain, and
the parties need no longer contract with each other. " These main-
tenance provisions are justified primarily by recompense for fore-
gone earning capacity and by contribution to the welfare of the
family. 190
Courts have traditionally awarded periodic maintenance to a
homemaker spouse of a long-term marriage, apparently to cover
lost earning opportunities. Property is awarded to the homemaker
spouse as payment for that spouse's investment in the other
spouse's earning capacity.' 9 ' A court's award of periodic mainte-
nance would not be sufficient, since this does not provide for the
return on investment expected by the spouse who supported the
family during the investment period. Also, periodic maintenance
does not take into account opportunities foregone by the support-
ing spouse.' 92
Rehabilitative maintenance has been used as a remedy to en-
able the supporting spouse, the investor, to develop potential earn-
ing capacity of his or her own.193 The shortcoming of this approach
is that, unless the training costs and increase in future earnings for
both the investor and investee are approximately equivalent, the
investor will not be adequately compensated for his or her contri-
bution in money and foregone opportunities.
The remedy of in-gross maintenance appears to be the best
method of ensuring that an investing spouse is compensated for a
contribution to the other spouse's increased earning capacity under
the human capital theory. 94 As Professor Kranskopf notes: "The
most significant advantage of in gross maintenance is that it allows
compensation tailored to protect expectation interests rather than
188. Id. at 394-95.
189. Id. at 396-97.
190. Id. at 398.
191. Id. at 399.
192. Id. See also Inman v. Inman, 578 S.W 2d 266.
193. Morgan v. Morgan, 81 Misc. 2d 616, 366 N.Y.S.2d 977, (1975), rev'd, 52
A.D. 804, 383 N.Y.S.2d 343 (1976), reversed on ground that New York law allowed
alimony based only on present circumstances of the parties, implying that reha-
bilitative alimony was not authorized.
194. Kranskopf, supra note 181, at 400-01.
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providing only 'damages' in the form of periodic alimony for the
lost opportunities of the relying spouse." 95  This type of
maintanence award would be nonmodifiable and would best serve
the investing spouse who cannot increase his or her earning capac-
ity because of illness or age; it also would protect the investing
spouse of a marriage with limited material assets. 96
The amount of the in-gross maintenance award would vary,
under the human capital model, according to the evidence of ex-
pectations. In other words, evidence of present value of the in-
creased earning capacity can be submitted. If there is no expert
evidence to this effect, then a restitutionary award for costs ex-
pended by the investor would be the only appropriate award.'97 An
increase in earning capacity of the investor attributable to the
couple's efforts would be subtracted from the increase in earning
capacity of the investee, as would any educational debts still to be
paid by the investee spouse. 98
The human capital model, with its recognition of value of in-
vestment in human capital, seems to be both rooted in sound eco-
nomic principle and to be practically adaptive to the marital disso-
lution situation. The analysis of the human capital concept reveals
that it fits traditional legal concepts such as recompense and pre-
vention of unjust enrichment. In the marriage involving an invest-
ing spouse and a recipient/investee, the adoption of the human
capital concept will foster an equitable settlement upon dissolu-
tion, a settlement that will compensate for foregone opportunities
and expectations as well as provide restitution for costs expended
in investment.
VI. CONCLUSION
The inclusion of the professional degree among marital assets
at the time of marital dissolution is occurring with increasing fre-
quency. Recognizing that a degree is a thing of value to which the
marital community has contributed is a sound step in achieving
economic parity between former spouses. First, it is indisputable
that the acquisition of a degree typically enables one spouse to
command higher job status and earnings over a lifetime. Second,
especially in short-term marriages, the degree is often one of the
195. Id. at 401.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 402.
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few assets that the marital community has accumulated. For one
spouse to exit the marriage with that asset, to which the other
spouse has undeniably contributed labor and financial resources, is
not only inequitable, but it also is inconsistent with both commu-
nity property and equitable distribution theory. Further, refusing
to recognize the value of the professional degree and to account for
that value upon divorce discourages two individuals from planning
and working together for the good of the marital unit. For this rea-
son, judicial compensation for the contributions of one spouse to-
ward the degree of the other spouse creates a more equitable soci-
ety in the broadest sense.
It is the methodology for compensation that provides fertile
ground for debate. Treating the degree as property is problematic
on several counts. The professional degree does not share compo-
nents of property in the traditional sense, and many courts are
hesitant to embrace the more progressive concepts of property es-
poused by the Uniform Marital Property Act. However, it bears
emphasizing that the creature known as "marital property" was
born of legislative efforts and, as such, the offspring cannot be ex-
pected to share many familial characteristics with the historical
concept of property. Moreover, the conceptual basis of community
property and equitable distribution legislation involves the recog-
nition of marriage as a partnership to which both partners contrib-
ute. Upon that partnership's dissolution, all circumstances relevant
to the acquisition and value of marital assets are considered pursu-
ant to the statutory scheme of property distribution. Certainly val-
uing the asset once it is so determined is more involved than find-
ing the professional degree to be property. This article has
discussed valuation procedures, including establishing future earn-
ing capacity and determining the increased earning capacity attrib-
utable to the professional degree. While any valuation of intangible
property involves certain variables, courts have been successful in
valuing intangible property for nearly a century. The argument
that we cannot treat the professional degree as property simply be-
cause the determination of value may be difficult is logically incon-
sistent with approaches taken in other areas of the common law.
North Carolina's property caselaw is expansive enough to in-
corporate the professional degree as a marital asset within the ex-
isting definition of property. However, given the tendency of our
state courts to adopt traditional approaches, it is unlikely that the
North Carolina judiciary will treat the professional degree as prop-
erty divisible upon divorce. The court of appeals' decision in Geer
1987]
39
Gailor and McGill: The Equitable Distribution of Professional Degrees upon Divorce i
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1987
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
v. Geer did not even address the treatment of the degree as prop-
erty, although a review of the available caselaw at the date of deci-
sion indicates that a discussion of that treatment would have re-
sulted in a stronger decision.
Courts that hesitate, for whatever rationale, to assign to the
professional degree the attributes of property and proceed with its
valuation nonetheless can accomplish results consistent with the
intent of equitable distribution and community property statutes.
Traditional compensation methods such as reimbursement and
restitution as well as other compensatory methods, such as dispro-
portionate property awards, can be successfully employed to com-
pensate the non-degree spouse for his/her contributions. Reim-
bursement is probably the least complicated method of
compensation, although such compensation is woefully inadequate
unless made at present value of the resources expended. The
North Carolina decision in Geer illustrates reimbursement theory,
which is an incomplete fit into a factual framework and which re-
sulted in an insufficient and unequal compensation.
Restitution, based on principles of equity, seeks to compensate
a spouse who incurred a detriment by conferring a benefit (the de-
gree) upon the other spouse so that he/she is unjustly enriched.
This article has alluded to one philosophical problem courts have
had when attempting to apply restitution theory to the spousal de-
gree situation, namely the requirement of a finding of unjust en-
richment. This element invites interjection of fault evidence, and
many jurisdictions disallow introduction of all fault evidence in
property distribution hearings. Evidence of certain marital fault
such as adultery would, of course, be irrelevant to the issue of un-
just enrichment and should be excluded. However, other states, in-
cluding North Carolina, allow evidence of economic fault to be in-
troduced. Economic fault (and loss) would easily find a place in the
context of unjust enrichment theory, as a consideration of the eco-
nomic injustice rendered by the community investment made with
no return on the investment for one member of the marital com-
munity. The major difficulty seen by these writers in applying res-
titution theory in this area is that many courts who purport to be
employing restitutionary principles are, in fact, merely misnaming
reimbursement and applying its principles instead. North Caro-
lina's equitable distribution statute could clearly encompass resti-
tution concepts, with its requirement that trial courts consider a
spouse's indirect and direct contributions that aid the education
and/or develop the career potential of the other spouse.
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Finally, some courts have chosen to compensate the contribut-
ing spouse by awarding a greater share of the marital property to
that spouse upon distribution. The problem with the property dis-
tribution approach is that often there is a dearth of marital prop-
erty to be distributed, especially in short-term marriages or in
those that disintegrate shortly following the marital unit's invest-
ment of resources in the acquisition of the degree. Where the pro-
fessional degree is the most significant asset of the marital commu-
nity, the distribution of property to compensate contribution to
degree acquisition does not present a viable approach.
The 1987 North Carolina Court of Appeals decision in Geer
does not address the threshold question of the degree as "prop-
erty" of the marital community to be valued and distributed. How-
ever, Geer is significant in its recognition of the value contributed
by one spouse's financial resources invested in the other spouse's
degree. A more comprehensive decision would have recognized and
compensated the spouse's non-monetary contributions, which cer-
tainly facilitated the acquisition of the degree. Geer is self-limiting
in its failing to address non-monetary or indirect contributions of
the non-degree spouse or bring to present value the monetary con-
tributions. The result is that resources invested in the degree ac-
quisition are rewarded inadequately by compensation occurring
nearly ten years after the investment. Certainly "equitable" distri-
bution is not achieved without adjusting the compensation to pre-
sent value, and later decisions by the North Carolina courts should
rectify this inequity.
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